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SEC RULE X-ioB-5 AS A WEAPON AGAINST THE
STOCK SWINDLE
Prior to the Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,2 a person defrauded in a securities transaction had only
the common law action of deceit on which to rely for relief, unless
the mail fraud statute was applicable.3 The common law action of
fraud and deceit became impractical in many instances because the
more astute swindlers found that the elements of this tort served as
guide posts which enabled them, by using only half-truths, omissions,
opinions and puffings, to avoid actual commission thereof.4 A weapon
presently being used against fraudulent half-truths and misleading
omissions in securities transactions is section ioB5 of the Securities
Exchange Act and rule X-ioB-5
0 promulgated by the Securities and
148 Stat. 74 (933), 15 U.S.C. § 77 a (1958).
248 Stat. 881 (934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1958).
318 U.S.C. § 1341 (1958).
"In order to sustain a cause of action at common law for fraud and deceit the
defrauded party had to show that a false misrepresentation of fact had been made
by the defendant; that the defendant knew such statement was false; that the de-
fendant intended the plaintiff to act in reliance upon the statement; that, in fact,
the plaintiff did reasonably rely thereon; and that the plaintiff suffered damages as
a result of such reliance. Prosser, Torts § 86 (2d ed. 1955). The leading case on this
subject is Derry v. Peek, [1888] 14 A.C. 337- See also Shulman, Civil Liability and the
Securities Act, 43 Yale L.J. 227, 233 (1933); White, From the Frying Pan into the
Fire: Swindlers and the Securities Acts, 45 A.B.A.J. 129, 130 (1959).
5T'his section reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange... to use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors." 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958).
6This rule reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person directly or
indirectly, by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. (b) To make any untrue statements of a ma-
terial fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person ... in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 24 o.lob-5 (1949). The SEC
adopted the language for this rule from section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933-
48 Stat. 84-85 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1958).
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Exchange Commission in i94' under the authority of that statutory
section. The statute and the rule prohibit fraudulent practices in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
7
A recent expansion in the meaning of the term "sale" is found in
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp s decided by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. The principal question in this case was whether
a corporation misled by fraud into the issuance of its stock in re-
turn for spurious assets is a seller, or, whether such a transaction
could be called a sale under X-ioB-5 of the Exchange Act.
9 If this
action was within the purview of the Exchange Act so that service of
process could run throughout the nation, then the federal district
court in Alabama could obtain jurisdiction over the non-resident de-
fendants. 10 Ofn the other hand, if this transaction was not covered
by the Exchange Act under section ioB and rule X-loB-5, the federal
The purpose for the adoption of X-IoB-5 was stated in Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.sd 461 (2d Cir. 1952): "While the Rule may have been somewhat
loosely drawn its meaning and scope are not difficult to ascertain when reference is
had to the scheme of SEC Regulations and the purpose underlying the adoption
of X-ioB-5, Prior to its adoption the only prohibitions against fraud in the sale or
purchase of securities were contained in Section 17(a) of the"9s3 Act, 15 US.C.A. §
77q(a) and Section 15(c) of the L934 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 780(c). Section 17(a) of the
1933 Act only made it unlawful to defraud or decive purchasers of securities, and
Section 15(c) of the 1934 Act dealt only with fraudulent practices by security
brokers or dealers ih over-the-counter markets. No prohibition existed against
fraud on a seller of securities by the purchaser if the latter was not a broker or
dealer.... [T]he SEC adopted Rule § XioB-5 to close this...loophole in the pro-
tection against fraud ... by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying se-
curities if they engage in fraud in their purchase." 193 F.2d at 463.
In Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953), the court said: "We think
the authors of the Act realized that the remedy of the abuses sought to be applied
by the Act would be more or less completely effective in the proportion of security-
trading done on or through the established businesses. To this end § io was enact-
ed in order that those who desire to promote crooked deals would see little ad-
vantage in using devious methods to by-pass the security dealing business houses
under regulation..And further, 'that prospective crooked deals would be under a
powerful deterrent by reason of the fact that perpetrators of fraud in security
exchanges would be in violation of federal laws." 203 F.2d at 631.
0282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 196o). Cert denied, 365 U.S. 814 (196).
'Id at 2oo.
"'None of the defendants were residents of Alabama; however, if the court
found this transaction to come within the purview of section ioB and rule X-ioB-5,
service of process would run throughout the entire United States under section
27 of the Securities Exchange Act. Also, if the court found the alleged fraudulent
transaction to come within the provisions of X-ioB-5, the plaintiff could get into
the federal court without diversity by showing that such fraud was perpetrated
through the use of any means or facility of interstate commerce, either directly
or indirectly. If this is shown, the plaintiff receives the additional benefits of federal
procedure and discovery methods, as well as pendent jurisdiction by the federal
court over non-securities transaction. Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956).
CASE COMMENTS
court could not get jurisdiction over these defendants, and the com-
plaint would have to be dismissed, leaving the plaintiff to his other
remedies. 1' The federal district court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the fraudulent scheme was not in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.12 On appeal, this decision was re-
versed. Whether or not there was a "purchase" of securities was im-
material, for the Court of Appeals held that there was a "sale" within
the meaning of the Exchange Act.'
3
The swindle as originally planned involved a rather complicated
scheme aimed at obtaining control of the then unissued stock of Con-
solidated American Industries. Briefly, the scheme was: (i) to form a
corporate vehicle through which certain worthless contract rights
could be exchanged for Consolidated's unissued stock; (2) the dis-
solution of the vehicle corporation; (3) the distribution of Consoli-
dated's stock to the owners of the vehicle corporation as a liquidating
dividend; and (4) the later disposition of such stock over-the-counter,
allegedly exempt from SEC registration.14
The actual accomplishment of this scheme was not carried out in
the above manner but by presenting certain forged documents to
Consolidated's transfer agent.15 In so doing, however, the swindlers
did secure control of 700,000 shares of previously unissued Consoli-
dated stock, over 400,000 shares of which were then sold to individual
investors throughout the world.' 6 The par value of such stock was
only one cent per share, but its market trading value was $1.oo per
share. Thus this swindle apparently netted, before expenses, over
$400,000.1"
The method of accomplishing this swindle, contrary to the original
plan, presented the court with certain difficulties in fitting the com-
plaint into rule X-loB-5 under the Exchange Act, an Act apparently
designed to deal with the more sophisticated swindle, such as the
one originally planned in this case. However, the court virtually
treated the original plan of the swindle as though it had been accom-
plished, with the result that the opinion contains loose factual as well
as legal ends, not entirely concealed by its somewhat flippant tenor.
3tRecission of the issue of the stock by the trustee in bankruptcy, Hooper, may
have been an available remedy; or perhaps an action for common law deceit could
have been utilized by the plaintiff.
"rhe case is apparently unreported.




17282 F.2d at i99.
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The principal arguments which the defendants made were that the
transaction and suit were not within the purview of rule X-ioB-5 be-
cause: (i) The Act was designed to protect investors, and a corpora-
tion issuing its own stock is not an investor;'8 (2) The issue of
corporate stock is not a sale of such stock so as to qualify under
this rule;19 (3) The. Exchange Act does not authorize a private right of
action where the sale of securities is made directly by a seller to a
buyer, and not through a securities exchange or an organized over-
the-counter market.20
In discussing the first argument the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit stated that the SEC had two bases under section ioB for the
promulgation of X-ioB-5 -"in the public interest" or "for the pro-
tection of investors." Since the SEC could promulgate this rule "in
the public interest," a corporation defrauded into the issuance of its
own stock for worthless assets may rely upon this rule for a right of
action, even though the corporation is not an investor.21 Taking this
position, the court reasoned that since the broad purpose of the leg-
islation is to keep the channels of interstate commerce, the securities
exchanges, and the mail free from fraud the expression "in the pub-
lic interest" does not require those intended for protection to be
part of the general public.22
In discussing the second issue, whether the issuance of corporate
stock may be a sale of stock under X-ioB-5, the court did not analyze
the fraudulent scheme in terms of accepted legal or accounting doc-
trines in regard to the issuance of unissued stock.2 As this -court
viewed the matter, before the transaction the corporation had 700,000
shares of unissued stock which it could issue to the public in exchange
for property, while after the transaction the corporation had only
worthless property. Thus, the court said that the transaction had




2A corporation qualifies for protection under this rule. Slavin v. Germantown
Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799, 8o5 (3d Cir. 1949) (dictum). 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1958).
'282 F.2d at 2o2. See also note 7 supra.
"The general rule is as follows: Certificates of stock are not property of the
issuing corporation. They are only evidences of the respective units of interest
owned by the several stockholders in a corporation. x3 Am. Jur. Corporations § 173
(1938).
2"Certainly the transactions between Consolidated and the apparent trans-
feree, Mid-Atlantic, had many earmarks of a sale. Mid-Atlantic had properties which
it ostensibly valued highly. It was willing to trade these properties as consideration
for Consolidated stock." 282 F.2d at 202.
CASE COMMENTS
The court found a stronger basis for this part of the decision, how-
ever, in the definition of sale contained in section 3(a)(14) of the Ex-
change Act. According to that definition, "[T]he terms 'sale' and 'sell'
each include any. contract to sell or otherwise dispose of" securities.25
Relying upon this definition, the court said, "If this is not a sale in
the strict common law traditional sense, it certainly amounted to an
arrangement in which Consolidated 'otherwise dispose[d] of' its
stock." 20
The court, in reaching a decision upon the third point, expressly
applied for the first time the doctrine formulated in Kardon v. Nation-
al Gypsum Co. which allowed a private civil right of action for a vio-
lation of X-loB-5 where facilities of mail or interstate commerce are
utilized in connection with a sale or purchase of securities. 27 The
principle in Kardon had been recently recognized in the Fifth Cir-
cuit, although not applied.2 8 Moreover, the court stated that a pri-
vate right of action is available in the Fifth Circuit even though
the fraudulent transaction is conducted directly between the buyer
and seller and not through a securities exchange or an organized
over-the-counter market.29 The court found much authority for its
decision in cases from other circuits dealing with this problem. By
virtue of the Hooper decision a private right of action for violation
of X-ioB-5 is now accepted law in the Second,30 Third,3 1 Fifth and
Ninth Circuits,3 2 and this in itself appears to be a powerful deterrent
against the stock swindle.
The Hooper case illustrates another expansion of X-loB-5 in hold-
ing that the term "to otherwise dispose of" securities is not meaning-
less. It will be invoked to encompass those securities transactions where
fraud is involved even though there is no purchase or sale in the
traditional sense. Further, rule X-ioB-5 will be treated by the Fifth
Circuit as if it had been promulgated by the SEC expressly "in the
"When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-The terms
'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 48 Stat.
72 (933), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1958).
M28 2 F.2d at 203.
"69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. x946). It may be noted that a private right of
action for violation of the Securities Act of 1933 is now also available. Osborne v.
Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
BReed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314, 315 (5th Cir. 1959).
2282 F.2d at 201.
'4Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
3 Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d ir. 1949).
-1Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. x956); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627
(9th Cir. 1953).
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public interest" as well as for the protection of the investor. What ad-
ditional legal effect will arise from this holding is presently unknown.
It is, however, clear that neither an individual nor a corporation
needs the status of an investor to obtain relief from fraud under this
rule.
This case is consistent with other recent decisions broadly con-
struing X-ioB-5 as a weapon to be used against the stock swindle. For
example, it has been held unnecessary under X-ioB-5 to allege that
actual fraud occurred through the use of the mails or interstate com-
merce, but it is only necessary to show that fraud did take place in
connection with a sale or purchase of securities.33 Also, one court
held recently that this rule is applicable to civil actions where a plain-
tiff seeking damages has been defrauded in transactions involving
both securities and non-securities, so long as the fraud occurs in a
single overall scheme involving the purchase or sale of securities.
4
To qualify for relief under X-ioB-5 the misrepresentations or fraud
do not need to relate to the securities themselves but only to the con-
sideration paid for the securities.3 5
Notwithstanding the fact that courts are presently construing the
Rule broadly, it does have important limitations. Proof of fraud is
a prerequisite to establish a cause of action under X-xoB-5 , whereas
under section ii(b)36 of the Securities Act, proof of misstatements
and omissions in the registration statement or prospectus is all that
is necessary. However, even an action under ii(b) may be supple-
mented by X-ioB-5 in certain instances where some element of fraud
is cognizable 37
Whether this decision in[Hooper is one of policy, peculiar to the
facts of this case, or whether it carries out actual legislative intent
under ioB, it is submitted that the court reached a correct result. To
hold otherwise, by not allowing relief under X-ioB-5 , would perhaps
have made it necessary for the trustee in bankruptcy, Hooper, to in-
stitute suits against numerous bona fide purchasers to rescind the
stock transfer. Since over 400,000 shares were distributed through-
out the world, such a procedure would have been impracticable, to
say the least 3 8 Perhaps Hooper could have relied upon the common
OFrratt v. Robinson, 203 F.d 627, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1953).
"Errion v. Connell, 236 F.9d 447, 456 (9th Cir. 1956).
'See note 33 supra.
w48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77 k (1958).
Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 15).
'In an action for recission, Hooper would not have to show any damage
suffered. 59 Yale L.J. 1120, 1131 (195o). However, without the benefit of X-o-5 ,
the cost of such a procedure would be prohibitive.
